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The  analysis  of  the  political  consequences  of  electoral  laws  has  emphasized  how 
individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, 
ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. 
This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important 
consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom 
to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ 
freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district 
size and electoral formulae. Using data from twenty nine countries, we find that neither 
proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ 
freedom  of  choice.  This  result  has  important  normative  implications  for  electoral 
reform.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Electoral systems are perhaps the most powerful set of rules in representative 
democracies.  There  is  widespread  agreement  that  elements  of  electoral  systems  –  
electoral formulas, district magnitude, and electoral thresholds - influence, although not 
mechanically, political outcomes such as the number of political parties in parliament, 
the internal structure of these parties, the political stability, and the proportionality of 
vote shares and seat shares.  In short, electoral laws have political consequences (Rae 
1971,  Lijphart  1990,  Mueller  1996).  To  analyze  these  consequences  the  relevant 
variables must be measurable.  District magnitude and electoral thresholds are measured 
quantitatively and electoral formulas are measured qualitatively. Both variables impact 
the political outcomes measured by indexes such as the disproportionality index
1 and 
the  effective  number  of  parties  in  parliament.
2 Such  indeces  are  very  important  to 
understand  the  likely  effects  of  electoral  reforms;  namely  how  changes  in  certain 
variables of the electoral systems affect objectives like political stability or the fairness 
of representation.  
The  effect  of  electoral  systems,  and  more  specifically  the  effect  of  ballot 
structures, on the type of members of parliament elected did not receive much attention 
during  the  twentieth  century.  However,  in  the  nineteenth  century  John  Stuart  Mill 
(1861), Thomas Hare (1859) and other prominent social reformers were perfectly aware 
that  electoral  systems  were  crucial  in  determining  the  personality,  intelligence  and 
                                                 
1 In this paper we will use the disproportionality index of Loosemore-Hanby (1971) which divides by two 
the sum of the module of differences between each party’s seat share and vote share. Michael Gallagher 
(1991) suggested another index, and Bernie Grofman and others suggested that instead of scaling by one 
half the vote-seat deviation, it should be scaled by the effective number of parties. We agree that for some 
purposes of empirical analysis it is more accurate to use the effective number of parties. However, if it is 
necessary to disentangle the effect of an electoral system variable on proportionality and the effective 
number of parties, it should not be included. This is one of the reasons why we develop in this paper two 
freedom of choice indices, one that does not depend on the number of parties (FC1) and another that does 
depend on the number of parties(FC2).    
 
2 The most frequently used index is the inverse of the sum of the squared percentage of seats that each 
party has in parliament (see Laakso and Taagepera (1979)).   3 
interests of those elected to serve as members of parliament.  Mill (1861, p. 256) states 
that “It has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two 
kinds:  danger  of  a  low  grade  of  intelligence  in  the  representative  body,  and  in  the 
popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the 
numerical majority.”  He was conscious that a critical issue in determining “intelligence 
in the representative body” was the extent of political competition to access parliament, 
and that the level of political competition is influenced by the ballot structure and the 
electoral formula. In a certain sense Mill and Hare were calling for attention to the 
personal consequences of electoral laws.
3   
To  date,  the  research  on  the  importance  of  ballot  structures  is  somewhat 
inconclusive and it is target to the political (not personal) consequences of electoral 
laws.  Rae (1971) formulated the hypothesis that “ordinal” ballots, where voters can 
choose more than one party (candidate), are more favorable to a fragmented parliament 
(greater  effective  number  of  parties  in  parliament)  than  a  “categorical”  vote,  where 
voters  have  to  vote  just  for  one  party  (or  candidate).    However,  he  rejected  the 
hypothesis. Subsequently, Lijphart (1990) replicated Rae’s work with more data and 
different methodology and reached a similar conclusion; ballot structure is not a very 
relevant variable in electoral systems.  Lijphart only found evidence of the importance 
of ballot structures in plurality  rule systems  where the Australian  “alternative” vote 
produces more parties than the UK plurality rule.  Few authors have recently addressed 
the importance of the information given in the ballot  (Bowler and Grofman (2000), 
Carey  and  Shughart  (1995),  Farrell  and  McAllister  (2006),  Norris  (2003)).  The 
                                                 
3 John Stuart Mill was a supporter of Thomas Hare’s single transferable vote electoral formula, based on 
the expected effects on the representation of minorities and also the attributes of representatives. On this 
last point he says (Mill 1861 p. 264): “At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more 
difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. 
The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish 
expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the 
two great parties from their London clubs…”.   4 
disregard of this issue may be associated with the difficulty to capture the diversity of 
ballot structures within a single measure. 
  In this paper we focus on voters’ freedom of choice. Implicitly we assume that 
the personal attributes of members of parliament are, in a large measure, a function of 
the degree of competition for a seat in parliament. This competition can arise from two 
different  processes:  internal  party  competition  independent  of  voters’  preferences  or 
party competition driven (in a greater or lesser extent) by voters’ preferences.  Voters’ 
freedom of choice is greater when voters have more candidates and political platforms 
to choose from, more possibility to express their preferences, and more information 
about the candidates.  
Therefore, one aim of this paper is to make the case that it is worth measuring 
freedom of choice because of its intrinsic and instrumental values. Freedom of choice is 
one of the criteria that should be considered in electoral reform. A second aim is to 
indirectly test Rae and Lijphart’s hypothesis of a quasi nonexistent relationship between 
ballot  structure  and  either  proportionality  or  party  fragmentation.  A  third  aim  is  to 
develop  a  synoptic  index  that  captures  different  degrees  of  “freedom  of  choice”  in 
different democracies and clarify the possible applications of such an index in testing 
new hypotheses. Therefore, Section 2 clarifies the concept of “freedom of choice” from 
the  perspective  of  social  choice  theory.  Section  3  builds  the  index  from  three 
dimensions: choices available to voters, effective preferences they can express in the 
ballot, and information concerning candidates. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence 
on “freedom of choice” and how it relates to proportionality and the effective number of 
parties. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications for electoral reform of our analysis 
and develops several hypotheses that can further be tested with the present index. 
   5 
2. Freedom and choice:  concept and measures. 
 
Liberty  and  freedom  of  choice  have  been  extensively  discussed  by  eminent 
scholars  in  quite  different  perspectives  (e.g.  Isaiah  Berlin  (1969)  and  Amartya  Sen 
(1988,  1991)).  The  most  useful  approach  for  our  purposes  here  is  the  axiomatic 
approach that has been developed in social choice literature. 
In  some  sense,  what  distinguishes  democracy  from  authoritarian  regimes  is 
freedom of choice. Consider a case where a ruler unilaterally transfers his power to his 
son,  and  the  alternative  case  where  his  son  obtains  the  power  through  winning  a 
competitive and deliberatively fair struggle to obtain popular support in a democratic 
election.  Although the ultimate ruling person is the same, the democratic process is 
associated with citizens’ freedom to “choose” (directly or indirectly) the new leader. 
  This  example  also  highlights  an  important  point  that  has  been  emphasized 
particularly  by  Amartya  Sen  (1991),  concerning  the  “instrumental”  and  “intrinsic” 
values of freedom of choice. The value of freedom of choice in democracy is not just 
that there is a higher probability that better leaders are selected (or incompetent leaders 
dismissed),  but  also  the  intrinsic  value  associated  with  participation  in  the  political 
process.  
Consider an individual who eats a “pastel de nata” with an espresso everyday, 
which  he  selects  from  a  menu  (or  opportunity  set)  of  many  cakes  and  diverse 
beverages.
4  If he was forced to eat that meal, he would not stand it. The fact that people 
value  outcomes  and  procedures  (the  way  those  outcomes  are  reached)  show  two 
different dimensions of freedom of choice. 
                                                 
4 The “pastel de nata” is a typical and well known Portuguese cake.    6 
  Most people agree that the “intrinsic” value of freedom of choice increases (even 
at a diminishing rate) with the augmentation of the opportunity set. If she has more 
cakes to choose from, her freedom of choice increases, even if she still chooses to eat 
the same “pastel de nata,” because she prefers this cake to any other that was added to 
the set.
5 Conversely, if her opportunity set decreases, her freedom to choose decreases.  
In this paper we will assume that freedom of choice increases (decreases) when 
the elements in the opportunity set increase (decrease). One simple measure for ranking 
opportunity sets according to freedom of choice is the cardinality of the sets.
6  If one has 
three cakes one has more freedom than if one has only two.   
In markets choice is over private goods and it is a real choice.  However, in 
politics, we are in the realm of collective or social choices. The information citizens 
express  through  the  ballot  is  aggregated  and  transformed  through  the  rules  of  the 
electoral system into a social choice.  Each citizen does not “choose” anything, but 
instead he has a greater or smaller freedom to express his preferences concerning the 
opportunity set that is presented to him.  
Apart  from  the  cardinality  of  the  opportunity  set  there  are  three  additional 
dimensions that could be considered in order to measure freedom of choice. The first 
dimension is the number of items that can be selected from the “menu.”  If just one item 
can be selected from a given set, the freedom to choose is less than if the choice is 
between two items of the same set. Alternatively, the same number of available choices 
(e.g. 2) in menus of different sizes (e.g. 3 and 6 items) is also associated with different 
                                                 
5 There is, however, an objection to that assertion. From a cognitive perspective some authors have been 
arguing that, after some point, to have more elements in the opportunity set create cognitive dissonance so 
that less is better than more.  
6 This measure has been suggested by Pattanaik and Xu (1990). Three axioms univocally determine this 
measure. First, the indifference between no-choice situations (e.g. indifference between two plebiscites 
with  different  candidates);  second,  strict  monotonicity  (e.g.  freedom  increases  when  the  number  of 
candidates increase); and third, independence. Sen (1991) argues that freedom should not include only the 
opportunities of choice available to the individual, but also take into account his preferences in relation to 
the elements of the opportunity set.    7 
degrees of freedom.
7  The second dimension is the information associated with each 
item in the menu. If she does not have any information concerning the characteristics of 
the items she is choosing from, her freedom is in some sense virtual. She could just 
select a random number to make her “choice”.  Ceteris paribus, the more information 
associated with each item in the menu, the greater the freedom to choose.
8 
9  Finally, 
freedom and liberty, in a positive sense, are also a function of an individual’s capability 
of knowing what is best for him and processing the relevant information in order to 
choose accordingly. 
The index developed in this paper considers the first three dimensions discussed 
above:  the  cardinality  of  the  opportunity  set,  the  number  of  effective  revealed 
preferences, and information concerning the candidates. The former two will be labelled 
as “options” and “choices.” However, the capabilities dimension is not introduced for 
simplicity reasons.        
 
3. Freedom of Choice : options, “choices” and information.  
 
The first critical issue we need to address is the options voters face to assess the 
cardinality of the opportunity set (the “menu” of choices).
10  We assume that, if given 
the chance, citizens will vote for political parties and for candidates (the “personal vote” 
                                                 
7 The more complicated issue is how to rank different size menus with different number of choices. The 
“freedom of choice” index developed in this paper, satisfies both conditions mentioned in the text, and 
has an implicit trade off between having more items to choose and more possibility to choose.  
8 Again, there are simple cases and more complicated cases. From a no information menu, to a menu 
where  I  have  information  on  one  item,  there  is  an  increasing  freedom.  This  is  the  simplest  case. 
Complicated cases are those where it is possible to have more information on some items and less in 
others. 
9 Information on political candidates can arise  from different sources: the candidates themselves, the 
political  parties,  interest  groups  and  the  media.  What  this  dimension  says  is  that  we  consider  more 
information  and  more  diversified  information  as  better  than  less  information.  Taking  into  account 
cognitive limitations, the marginal benefit of increasing information should be decreasing.    
10 The measure of freedom can be ordinal or cardinal. The discussion will be in terms of the cardinality of 
the opportunity set so that it is possible to rank all sets. Any concave and increasing function of that 
cardinality will enable to have an index with the properties of increasing marginal freedom (with the 
number of elements in the menu), but at diminishing rates.    8 
on  the  characteristics  of  the  candidates).  Since  each  political  party  has  a  distinct 
platform,  when  the  effective  number  of  parties  increases,  the  citizens’  freedom  to 
express political preferences in different ways also increases. This measure has been 
used widely in the literature and we also use it in the effective freedom of choice index 
(FC2). 
However, there is a problem with using the effective number of parties. Among 
other things, we want to analyze the possible causal effect of “freedom of choice” on the 
fragmentation of parliament (given by the effective number of parties). So in a simple 
freedom  of  choice  index  (FC1)  we  assume  that  opportunities  to  express  political 
preferences must be independent of the actual effective number of political parties. We 
consider three parties, a Left Party (L), a Center Party (C) and a Right Party (R), as the 
opportunities to express political preferences.
11  
   Apart  from  ideology,  we  assume  citizens  care  about  candidates’  personal 
characteristics  and  that  these  are  independent  of  political  platforms.
12   If  given  the 
opportunity,  citizens  would  vote  for  particular  candidates  as  well  as  for  political 
platforms. 
  To analyze the cardinality of different electoral systems, it is easiest to start with 
the simple index (FC1), looking at the following matrix, where each column refers to a 
different party (L, C, R) and each row is a candidate (1, 2, 3) belonging to the party’s 
list (when applicable). 
                                                 
11 The average effective number of parties in our sample of 29 countries is 3.81. However, we have 
chosen 3 for reasons of symmetry that can be justified to simultaneously treat ideological diversity and 
personal characteristics.    
12 If  we  were  to  consider  a  spatial  analysis,  which  is  not  the  case  here,  we  would  say  that  the  two 
dimensions are orthogonal. There is no a priori reason to suppose that leftwing politicians have better (or 
worse) attributes than right wing politicians. Note also that there can be a conflict between ideology and 
personal attributes.  The candidate “closest” to the voter ideology can have a low “score” on personal 
attributes and vice-versa.   9 
 
L1  C1  R1 
L2  C2  R2 
L3  C3  R3 
Table 1. Citizens’ opportunities to select candidates 
 
In the simple index we establish an upper limit for voters’ “options” given by the 
product of three parties and three candidates. This can be considered as an unnecessary 
constraint on voters’ available choices because some ballots allow for more options.   
However,  the  concept  of  freedom,  as  we  want  to  measure  it,  is  not  just  the  input 
information  that  the  voter  introduces  in  the  ballot,  but  it  is  also  related  to  the 
effectiveness of this information in the final selection of candidates.  This suggests a 
limitation in the available choices in the relevant opportunity set. Moreover, all citizens 
have cognitive limitations so that, even from the strict point of view of the voter input in 
the ballot, a limitation on available “choices” should be considered.  
The  “menus”  (opportunity  sets)  of  the  main  ballot  structures  and  electoral 
systems in the simple index (FC1) are the following: 
-  PR,  Plurality  Rule  with  nominal  vote  in  one  candidate  (e.g.  UK)  or  AV,  the 
“alternative” vote with ordinal vote (e.g. Australia): 
#Xplr=#Xpr_av=#{L, C, R }=3 
- AM – Absolute Majority rule in runoff elections (e.g. France) 
#Xam=#{L, C, R }=3 
- CLPR - Closed List Proportional Representation (e.g. Portugal) 
#Xclp=#{L, C, R}=3   10 
-  OLPR  -  Open  List  Proportional  Representation  (Preferential  Voting)  (e.g.  Czech 
Republic) 
#Xolp=#{L1, L2, L3, C1, C2, C3, R1, R2, R3}=9 
- STV - Single Transferable Vote (e.g. Ireland) 
#Xstv=#{L1, L2, L3, C1, C2, C3, R1, R2, R3}=9 
- MS Mixed systems using dual Ballot (e.g. Germany) 
#Xdb=#{L, C, R, Li, Ci, Ri}=6  
  Turning now to the revealed preferences of the voters it is important to define an 
upper boundary for the relevant number of revealed preferences, i.e. those which have 
an impact on candidate selection. Now we are addressing the issue of determining the 
number  of  items  available  for  a  voter  to  “select”  to  have  an  effective  impact  on 
candidates’ choice. We establish this number as three, since for the reasons stated below, 
the  practical  importance  of  citizens’  fourth  preference  is  rather  low  and  should  be 
disregarded.   
A main distinction between the different ballot systems is whether voters can 
reveal their first preference alone, or more. In plurality rule with a candidate ballot or in 
closed  list  proportional  representation  with  a  party  ballot,  voters  can  vote  for  one 
candidate or one party respectively, so that only the first preference counts. This has 
been labelled a “categorical” ballot in the literature. In all other systems voters can 
reveal more than one preference (ordinal or not) in what has been labelled “ordinal” 
balloting following Rae (1971).  
  In  the  French  electoral  system  (party  ballot  with  runoff),  if  a  party  has  an 
absolute majority the candidate of that party is elected. If not, there is a second round. 
So the second preference of the voter only is necessary in some districts. Therefore, we 
consider 1.5 to be the effective number of revealed preferences.   11 
  In  dual  ballots,  where  voters  have  the  single  member  district  to  vote  for 
candidates  and  regional  or  national  district  to  vote  for  parties,  voters  have  two 
“choices”.
13 
  Some  literature  considers  the  rank  ballot  has  giving  the  greatest  amount  of 
“choice”  to  the  voter.  In  fact,  the  voter  is  able  to  fully  or  partially  rank  order  the 
candidates across political parties. This is an input oriented interpretation of the ballot. 
However,  what  is  relevant  is  not  the  maximum  information  the  voter  can  express 
through the ballot, but the individual “choices” that are relevant for the collective choice 
of  candidates.  Taking  into  account  that  the  fourth  preference  onwards  has  a  minor 
impact on candidate selection, we assign the maximum value of three “choices” to STV, 
but also to the candidate-preference ballot of Australia, although here the choice set 
(number of candidates) is much smaller.  
  Given its diversity, the preferential system poses more difficulty in determining 
the available ballot “choices.” In preferential systems voters select the party in which to 
vote  and  then  can  order  (or  mark)  the  candidates  within  that  party  list.  In  “strong” 
preferential systems there is no minimum percentage below which the candidate does 
not get elected. In “weak” systems, there is a minimum percentage which functions as a 
party  “screen”  on  voters’  preferences.  If  he  can  not  reach  it,  and  if  proportional 
representation suggests that a candidate of that  party  must be elected, it is the first 
candidate of the party list who takes office. It also happens that the number of votes for 
the candidates from the party list can be restricted.
 14 This of course has an impact on 
                                                 
13 Lijphart (1990) correctly points out that the mixed systems should not be included in the “categorical” 
category as Rae (1971) did. We always use the term ordinal ballot within brackets because we can not say 
that  voters rank a party  with a candidate in  mixed systems. However,  we can say that they express 
preferences for a party and a candidate. 
14 It is the case of the Czech electoral system that there is a minimum percentage for the candidate to 
overrun the party list (7%) and also a maximum number of “approved candidates” in the ballot (recently 
reduced from four to two candidates) (see 2006 revision of Act 247/195). There are mainly two types of 
ballots used in preferential systems. Either the ballot allows selection of one or more candidates (approval) 
or the voter can actually rank the candidates. Note, however, that in the former case, “approval votes on   12 
citizens’  effective  freedom  to  choose.
  Clearly,  the  “choices”  available  in  open  list 
proportional  representation  systems  are  smaller  than  in  the  STV,  particularly  in  the 
“weak” systems.  
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* Available set of candidates/parties to choose from (in index FC1 below).   
** Number of relevant candidates/parties “chosen” by the voter in her ballot. [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2. Electoral systems, ballot structures, and voters’ options and “choices”. 
                                                                                                                                               
candidates” are used with electoral formulae (e.g. method d’Hondt) different from “approval voting” (see 
Brams and Fishburn 1983) which is not an electoral formula for multi-member districts.   13 
Therefore,  we  consider  two  choices  to  be  relevant  in  this  type  of  electoral 
system.
15 Table  2  summarizes  the  conclusions  concerning  available  “options”  and 
“choices”. 
   Finally, the last issue to address is the information available to the voter about 
the candidates. We assume that information on each candidate is a decreasing function 
of average district magnitude ( D S M = ), with S the size of the assembly and D total 
number of districts (upper and lower tier).
16 In single member districts, opportunities for 
interaction between candidates and voters are greater. This is important mainly for the 
knowledge  of  the  personal  attributes  of  particular  candidates.  Information  on  each 
candidate  decreases  as  the  size  of  the  district  increases.  This  can  arise  from  two 
different factors: the average number of mandates per district (in multi-member districts) 
increases  or  the  electorate  per  mandate  (in  single  member  districts)  increases.  It  is 
important to understand how M  takes into account this second factor in mixed systems. 









l h + = =           (1) 
In plurality rule with candidate ballot,  1 = M . In dual ballot systems the average district 
size (electors per mandate) is higher if, for a given number of electors, the number of 
single  member  districts  decreases.  This  effect  is  captured  by  M  as  the  following 
example illustrates. Korea has 253 single member districts (and respectively the same 
number of MPs) out of a total of 299 (85%). On the other hand, Germany has only 50% 
                                                 
15 It is clearly the case that in a set of k candidates, a partial ordering of n<k candidates is associated with 
more "freedom" than purely giving "approval" to the same subset of n candidates. In the former case there 
are factorial n (n!) different ways to express preferences, while in the latter just one (e.g. with n=3, 3!=6 
as opposed to 1). Our index is a function of approved candidates in the ballot because this is the essential 
information that is transformed through the electoral formula.  
16 Chin and Taylor-Robinson (p.465 2005) found that “voters in closed list proportional representation 
access less of the available candidate information compared with subjects in the SMD electoral system”.  
Our specification of the “information function” is consistent with their findings.   14 
of  MPs  elected  through  single  member  districts.  This  means  that,  disregarding  the 
absolute assembly size, Korea ( 18 . 1 = k M ) is much closer to the UK average district 
magnitude ( 1 = UK M ), than Germany ( 99 . 1 = G M ). Thus, taking the overall average 
district size, enables to distinguish between mixed systems with different proportion of 
MPs elected in single member districts.
17 
Amongst  different  possibilities  we  adopt  this  function  for  a  proxy  of  the 







=          (2) 
where  M log  stands for the decimal logarithm of M .  
Therefore, the simple index of freedom of choice is a combination of these three 
characteristics. It is an increasing function of voters’ available “options” (the cardinality 
of the opportunity sets), voters’ “choices” (the number of relevant revealed preferences), 
and the information about the chosen candidate.  To combine the first two aspects we 
use the geometric mean
19 and we multiply this value by the information value, assumed 
as  a  function  of M .  Consequently  the  index  is  based  on ) log 1 /( . M p c + ,  where  c 
stands  for  the  “options”  available  to  the  voters,  p  for  the  “choices”.  Finally  we 
                                                 
17 There  are  different  approaches  to  district  magnitude.  Rae  (1971)  considers  average  district  size. 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Taagepera (2002) use an “effective district magnitude” which is an 
implicit function of the assembly size and the number of seat winning parties. There is always a loss of 
information when using an average instead of the distribution of district magnitude, namely we loose the 
variation of the distribution (see Monroe and Rose (2002)). We agree with Taagepera’s criticisms to the 
average district magnitude, namely that it does not take into account neither effective thresholds nor the 
effects of nationwide compensation in a national district (when it applies). However, the effective district 
magnitude is an output based measure and since we want to built an input based index we follow Rae’s 
approach. Moreover, the aim of our analysis here is to measure how much information is provided by 
candidates to voters. As explained in the text, even when district magnitude is an average of several single 
member  districts  and  one  national  district,  district  magnitude  changes  with  the  proportion  of  seats 
allocated  in  single-member  districts.  The  implicit  assumption  is  that  for  a  given  assembly  size  and 
electorate, as the number of single member districts decreases, the size of each district increases and 
therefore the “information distance” between candidates and voters increase, i.e. there is an information 
loss.              
18 Since  it  is  a  convex  and  decreasing  function  of  M,  we  implicitly  assume  that  information  about 
candidates decreases at a diminishing rate (negative sign of second derivative). It means that when the 
district size increases from one to two, the information loss is greater than when it increases from 20 to 21.  
19 The geometric mean is computed by multiplying c and  p , then taking the square root of the product.   15 
standardize the formula in such a way that the index value for the candidate-ballot (UK, 
USA) is 1, i.e. for the country i the index is given by: 









=         (3) 
 
This index has an advantage of not being a function of the effective number of 
parties and will be used to analyze the relationship between the two variables.
20  
The effective freedom of choice index (FC2) is similar but we substitute 
* c  for c, 
indicating that available political “choices” take into account now the effective number 
of parties in parliament. Therefore the index is based on the expression 






   
To standardize the index we use as normalizing constant 
* / 1 us c , where 
*
us c  is 
the effective number of parties in the USA ( 99 . 1
* = us c ), so that the index assumes the 
unitary value in this country. For country j  the index is given by: 
*
,









=         (4) 
 
4. Empirical results: freedom of choice indices 
Table A1 (in the Appendix) shows the characteristics of electoral systems in the 
29 democracies we are analyzing. The mean district magnitudes, the effective number 
of parties and the Loosemore-Hanby proportionality index enables some comparison 
between the electoral systems.  
                                                 
20 Note that although it may seem that the index is asymmetric with respect to c and p, since the range of c 
is between 1 and 3 and the range of p, between 3 and 9, this is not the case. In fact, it can easily be 
demonstrated that we could multiply c by any positive scalar, so that the standardized index would not 
change.    16 
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Netherlands  4,81  150,00  0,95  0,49  0,31 
Party Ballot  Israel  5,63  120,00  0,96  0,55  0,32 
Party Ballot  Portugal  3,14  10,45  0,83  0,62  0,50 
Party Ballot  Norway  4,36  8,68  0,95  0,76  0,52 
Party Ballot  Romania  3,37  8,17  0,92  0,68  0,52 
Party Ballot  Spain  2,73  6,73  0,93  0,64  0,55 
Candidate-
Ballot  USA  1,99  1,00  0,94  1,00  1,00 
Candidate-
Ballot  UK  2,11  1,00  0,80  1,03  1,00 
Candidate-
Ballot  Canada  2,98  1,00  0,83  1,22  1,00 
Preference-
ballot  Czech Republic  4,15  25,00  0,89  1,48  1,02 
Preference-
ballot  Sweden  4,29  12,03  0,97  1,73  1,18 
Preference-
ballot  Slovenia  5,52  11,25  0,84  1,99  1,19 
Preference-
ballot  Denmark  4,92  10,53  0,98  1,90  1,21 
Preference-
ballot  Poland  2,95  8,85  0,82  1,53  1,26 
Preference-
ballot  Switzerland  5,08  7,69  0,93  2,08  1,30 
Preference-
ballot  Belgium  9,05  7,50  0,96  2,79  1,31 
Dual Ballot  Germany  3,30  1,99  0,94  1,98  1,54 
Dual Ballot  Russia  5,40  1,99  0,89  2,54  1,54 
Dual Ballot  Ukraine  5,98  1,99  0,86  2,67  1,54 
Dual Ballot  Hungary  3,45  1,97  0,86  2,03  1,55 
Dual Ballot  New Zealand  3,78  1,82  0,96  2,19  1,59 
Dual Ballot  Mexico  2,86  1,64  0,92  1,97  1,65 
Dual Ballot  Japan  2,93  1,61  0,86  2,01  1,66 
Cand-Pref-
Ballot  Australia  2,61  1,00  0,84  1,98  1,73 
Dual Ballot  Taiwan  2,46  1,42  0,95  1,93  1,74 
Rank-order  Malta  2,00  5,00  0,98  1,77  1,77 
Dual Ballot  Thailand  2,92  1,25  0,88  2,21  1,82 
Dual Ballot  Korea  2,36  1,18  0,84  2,03  1,87 
Rank-order  Ireland  3,39  3,95  0,88  2,45  1,88 
Table  3 Countries ranked by increasing voters’ freedom to choose MPs (FC1) 
An  application  of  the  “freedom  of  choice”  indices  to  several  types  of  ballot 
structures and electoral systems is shown in Table 3.  The two indices give a similar 
ranking of countries.    17 
The simple one (FC1) should be used to test hypotheses concerning the political 
consequences of electoral laws and to discuss electoral reforms, since it only depends on 
variables from the electoral system. The second one (FC2) gives more importance to 
freedom to express political preferences but is calculated taking into account electoral 
results.  
The  interpretation  of  the  FC1  index  is  straightforward  as  seen  in  section  3. 
Values can be directly compared with the reference value given by the candidate ballot 
system.  Consequently,  in  The  Netherlands  or  Israel,  the  freedom  of  choice  is 
approximately one third of the level existing in the UK or the U.S., while in Ireland the 
level  is  almost  twice  the  reference  value.  This  is  due  mainly  to  the  dimension  of 
(reduced) information on candidates in the former countries given that they just have 
one electoral district. On the other hand, Ireland has relatively small districts (for a 
proportional representation system) and benefits from a greater menu of voter choices.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from the index of freedom to choose (FC1). 
First,  we  can  derive  a  rough  ranking  of  the  different  ballot  structures:  Party  ballot, 
Candidate ballot, Preference ballot, Dual ballot, Candidate preference ballot and Rank 
order ballot, in ascending order. However, some countries have higher (smaller) values 
in the index than was previously supposed by the type of ballot they use.
21  
It is not surprising that the party ballot index is below the reference value given 
by the candidate ballot system. The options available to the voters and the possible 
“choices” are the same in both systems, yet in the party ballot, the voter has much less 
information concerning the personal characteristics of candidates.  
The  dual  ballot  systems  are  associated  with  quite  different  positions  in  the 
ranking  given  the  fact  that  mean  district  magnitude  is  significantly  different  from 
                                                 
21 This shows an important methodological difference between our approach and the traditional studies of 
ballot structure that just create a typology of different ballots and ranked them. We rank electoral systems, 
not ballot types.   18 
country to country (e.g. Germany (1.54) has a lower degree of freedom of choice than 
Korea (1.87)).  
  It is interesting to note how the proportionality index, such as the Loosemore- 
Hanby, and the freedom to choose index give different types of information on electoral 
systems. Australia and  Slovenia have the same degree of proportionality  (0.84), but 
voters’  freedom  to  choose  in  Australia  is  much  higher.  Norway  (party  ballot)  and 
Taiwan (dual ballot) also share the same high degree of proportionality (0.95) but voters 
in Taiwan have more possibilities to express their preferences.  
A similar situation occurs when we compare the effective number of political 
parties using the FC1 index. The USA and Malta have a similar effective number of 
political parties, but the FC1 index is much higher for Malta than for the USA.  
If  we  consider  a  more  aggregated  analysis  of  the  averages  of  “categorical” 
ballots  (Party  and  Candidate  ballots)  and  the  averages  of  “ordinal”  ballots  (all  the 
others) it is possible to test Rae’s hypothesis. Table 4 shows that, for each type of ballot, 
the averages of the effective number of parties and the degree of proportionality are 
similar. This gives support to the rejection of the hypothesis that the ballot structure has 
an effect either on the fragmentation of parliaments or on proportionality. On the other 
hand, as expected, ordinal ballots are associated with significant larger voters’ freedom 
of choice.
22  
                                                 
22 We test the hypothesis that there are no differences between means amongst the two groups for each 
characteristic (number of parties, average district magnitude, etc.), using a normal framework and the 
Welsch approximation, (i.e. we do not impose the equality of the variances in the two groups). At a 5% 
level, we do not reject the same means for the effective number of parties, the proportionality index, and 
the average district magnitude. However, we strongly reject the means equality for both the FC indeces. 
The use of more robust testing techniques leads to the same conclusions.   19 
 





























3.97  5.48  0.90  2.06  1.52 
Table 4– “Categorical” and “Ordinal” ballots 
 
It is also worth mentioning that the average district magnitude of ordinal ballots 
is relatively small, while it is very large in categorical ballots given the weight of party 
ballots.
23  
Finally, to analyze how the freedom to choose index can be related to other 
characteristics of an electoral system, such as proportionality or the effective number of 
political parties, we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is the 
effective number of parties and the covariates are the freedom of choice index (FC1) 
and the decimal logarithm of average district size. The estimated values are (standard 
errors below the estimated coefficients) 
(0.7232)                 (0.6072)                                    
1 7456 . 0 ) log( 6651 . 1 8105 . 1
^
FC M NParties + + =  
252 . 0
2 = R ,  29 = n ,  380 . 4 = − Statistic F ,  023 . 0 = − value p  
where NParties stands for the effective number of parties. 
We confirm that district magnitude is relevant for the effective number of parties 
but “freedom of choice” has no significant effect.
24 
                                                 
23 The no rejection of the equality of the means is due to a very large variance in each group, namely in 
the categorical one.   20 
  An important consequence of this result is that changes in electoral systems that 
increase voters’ “freedom of choice” do not have a significant negative impact, as could 
be  expected,  on  a  more  fragmented  parliament  and  therefore  they  do  not  stimulate 
increased instability in parliamentary regimes. 
  We also estimate the possible effect of “freedom of choice” on proportionality 
and reach a similar conclusion. The FC1 index is not statistically significant but the 
district magnitude is, now, marginally significant. 
(0.0273)                    (0.0229)                                   
1 0213 . 0 ) log( 0476 . 0 8448 . 0
^
FC M LHindex + + =  
162 . 0
2 = R ,  29 = n ,  524 . 2 = − Statistic F ,  100 . 0 = − value p  
where LHindex is the Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality.  
  The finding that “freedom of choice” does not affect these variables does not 
lead to the conclusion that it should be considered a “weak” variable. The arguments 
presented in section 2 that “freedom of choice” has an intrinsic value apart from an 
instrumental value implies that increasing freedom is valued positively on its own. In 
the next section, we will discuss some empirical evidence that suggests it can also have 
                                                                                                                                               
24 Since FC1 is also a function of M, there is some correlation between the independent variables. 
Although this introduces some multicollinearity into the model, the conclusions about the dependency 
between the effective number of parties and each variable are not affected.  We can verify that “freedom 
of choice” has no impact on the effective number of parties estimating the regression   
(0.5943)                                 
1 5938 . 0 549 . 4
^
FC NParties − =  
0357 . 0
2 = R ,  29 = n ,  9982 . 0 = − Statistic F ,  3266 . 0 = − value p . 
 
We can also observe the dependency between the effective number of parties and  M log  
(0.4483)                                    
) log( 242 . 1 010 . 3
^
M NParties + =  
221 . 0
2 = R ,  29 = n ,  680 . 7 = − Statistic F ,  0099 . 0 = −value p . 
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The  freedom  citizens  have  to  express  their  political  preferences  and  their 
preferences  concerning  relevant  characteristics  of  representatives  to  parliament 
(congress)  depend  on  the  structure  of  polity.  More  decentralized  structures  of 
government (in unitary or federal countries) are, ceteris paribus, associated with overall 
greater freedom of choice. This means that the results of this paper should be interpreted 
with  some  caution,  since  we  only  apply  the  index  to  national  legislatures  (lower 
house).
25 It is necessary to bear in mind that the role of the lower house is different in 
parliamentary and presidential regimes and also in unicameral and bicameral regimes.
26 
Moreover, we have not considered an obvious important factor, the internal competition 
within parties in organizing lists (when applicable).   
Having these provisos in mind, this paper developed an index of freedom of 
choice  of  members  of  parliament  that  takes  into  account  three  distinct  dimensions: 
voters’  “options”  (the  cardinality  of  the  choice  domain),  “choices”  (the  number  of 
revealed  preferences  on  candidates/parties),  and  “information”  (on  candidates 
characteristics).  Empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  index  can  not  be  univocally 
associated either  with electoral systems, proportionality indices, effective number of 
parties or other measures of electoral systems. In fact, one of the aims of developing 
                                                 
25 The index can also be applied to parliaments of States, Provinces or Lander in Federations. In those 
federations where there are significant linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other divisions and citizens are 
segregated in part according to these divisions, it is natural that if the electoral system is the same at 
national and regional levels, the effective number of parties is slightly higher at national level. Therefore,  
the average regional FC2 index should be smaller than the national FC2 index.  
26 Spindler and Tommasi (2007) argue that in the case of Argentina, the lower house has no significant 
effective power. If this is the case, it follows naturally that greater citizens’ freedom of choice in the same 
would not be very relevant to legislative behavior.      22 
such an index is to be able to discriminate between electoral systems having similar 
degrees of proportionality or similarly “fragmented” parliaments, as measured by the 
effective number of parties.  
  The debate around the reform of electoral systems - namely the possible shifts 
from  majoritarian  to  mixed  systems,  or  changes  within  proportional  representation 
regimes – arises from the fact that there are several relevant normative criteria (political 
stability,  fair  representation,  freedom  of  choice)  and  there  are  frequently  tradeoffs 
between them.
27  For example, there is a possible tradeoff between political stability and 
fair representation in parliamentary regimes: increased fairness of representation may 
lead to a more “fragmented” parliament and more unstable coalition governments
 28 
The empirical analysis developed in this paper shows that there seems to be no 
tradeoff between greater voter participation in the political process and either political 
stability or fair representation. The conclusion that greater “freedom of choice” does not 
have implications for proportionality or the effective number of parties has an important 
normative implication for electoral reform. It shows that it is possible to design systems 
with a greater role for voters’ participation in the political process without negative side 
effects. Though, it does not follow that greater citizens’ freedom-of-choice is always 
beneficial.  Political  parties’  role  in  screening  candidates  when  selection  follows  a 
competitive procedure may be important. Also, citizens have limited cognitive abilities 
so  that  expanding  freedom-of-choice  after  some  point  may  have  no  significant 
advantage.   
                                                 
27 See, among others,  Boix (1999), Norris (2004), Rae (1995), Schugart (2001) and Sen (1995). 
28 It is  worth distinguishing between formal political stability and informal political stability. Formal 
political stability is the capacity of governments to fulfill their normal legislative term (usually four years). 
It makes an emphasis on the parliament-executive relationship. The informal political stability is related 
to a low level of political conflict outside parliament. The tradeoff referred to is between formal political 
stability and fair representation.     23 
We have also shown that some ballot structures give more power to the voters 
and  less  to  the  party  elites  in  selecting  representatives.  Other  ballot  structures  give 
exclusive  selection  privileges  to  political  parties,  and  still  others  aim  for  a  more 
balanced  weight  of  voters  and  parties  in  the  selection  process.  The  importance  of 
measuring voters’ “freedom to choose” is precisely to weight the relative importance of 
voters and political parties in selecting candidates.  
The  hypothesis,  implicitly  formulated  by  Stuart  Mill,  that  the  quality  of 
representatives, as measured by voters’ standards, will depend on voters’ freedom of 
choice, can be tested controlling for the fact that it will also be a function of party 
selection  procedures.  Intuition  suggests  that  the  worst  situation  is  low  competition 
within parties, low freedom of choice and a presidential regime. 
There is some evidence that the degree of voter satisfaction is higher in countries 
where “freedom of choice is higher.”
29 Other hypotheses that have been tested and that 
deserve further research are the relationship between electoral systems and corruption,
30 
or the effects of freedom of choice on voter turnout, on the participation of women in 
politics or the intertemporal consistency of electoral promises by elected representatives.  
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Table A1 Countries ranked by increasing degree of proportionality of electoral systems 
Ballot Structure  Country  Number  Number   Number   Number 
of  Number  Prop.  Number   Mean 
District  Effective   Index Prop. 
      of MPs  of SMD  of MMD  Districts  of List 
MP  LMP/MPs  of MPs  Magnitude  N. Parties  (Loosemoore-
Hanby) 
Candidate-ballot  UK  659  659  0  659  0  0%  659  1.00  2.11  0.80 
Preference-ballot  Poland  460  0  52  52  460  100%  460  8.85  2.95  0.82 
Candidate-ballot  Canada  301  301  0  301  0  0%  301  1.00  2.98  0.83 
Party Ballot  Portugal  230  0  22  22  230  100%  230  10.45  3.14  0.83 
Cand-Pref-Ballot  Austrália  148  148  0  148  0  0%  148  1.00  2.61  0.84 
Dual Ballot  Korea  299  253  1  254  46  15%  299  1.18  2.36  0.84 
Preference-ballot  Slovenia  90  0  8  8  90  100%  90  11.25  5.52  0.84 
Dual Ballot  Japan  500  300  11  311  200  40%  500  1.61  2.93  0.86 
Dual Ballot  Hungary  386  176  20  196  210  54%  386  1.97  3.45  0.86 
Dual Ballot  Ukraine  450  225  1  226  225  50%  450  1.99  5.98  0.86 
Dual Ballot  Thailand  500  400  1  401  100  20%  500  1.25  2.92  0.88 
Rank-order  Ireland  166  0  42  42  166  100%  166  3.95  3.39  0.88 
Dual Ballot  Rússia  450  225  1  226  225  50%  450  1.99  5.40  0.89 
Preference-ballot  Czech Republic  200  0  8  8  200  100%  200  25.00  4.15  0.89 
Party Ballot  Romania  343  0  42  42  343  100%  343  8.17  3.37  0.92 
Dual Ballot  México  500  300  5  305  200  40%  500  1.64  2.86  0.92 
Party Ballot  Spain  350  0  52  52  350  100%  350  6.73  2.73  0.93 
Preference-ballot  Switzerland  200  0  26  26  200  100%  200  7.69  5.08  0.93 
Candidate-ballot  USA  435  435  0  435  0  0%  435  1.00  1.99  0.94 
Dual Ballot  Germany  656  328  1  329  328  50%  656  1.99  3.30  0.94 
Party Ballot  Norway  165  0  19  19  165  100%  165  8.68  4.36  0.95 
Party Ballot  Netherlands  150  0  1  1  150  100%  150  150.00  4.81  0.95 
Dual Ballot  Taiwan  334  234  2  236  100  30%  334  1.42  2.46  0.95 
Party Ballot  Israel  120  0  1  1  120  100%  120  120.00  5.63  0.96 
Dual Ballot  New Zealand  120  65  1  66  55  46%  120  1.82  3.78  0.96 
Preference-ballot  Belgium  150  0  20  20  150  100%  150  7.50  9.05  0.96 
Preference-ballot  Sweden  349  0  29  29  349  100%  349  12.03  4.29  0.97 
Rank-order  Malta  65  0  13  13  65  100%  65  5.00  2.00  0.98 
Preference-ballot  Denmark  179  0  17  17  179  100%  179  10.53  4.92  0.98 
Source: data for Portugal, Ireland and Malta collected and computed by the authors. Other data from Pippa Norris (2003). 
 